

*Security Sector
Reform in
Romania.*
Patterns of
Civil-Military
Relations in SEE.

Marian Zulean

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Security Sector Reform in Romania: Analysis of the Stability Pact Self-Assessment Studies

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The concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become prominent in the last couple of years, both for local decision-makers in South-Eastern European countries and the international community. Although the academic community has tried to define the term, the concept is still fuzzy when it comes to the develop-

ment of the community or the practical world of policy advisors related to assistance for security. The endeavors of defining the SSR concept were mostly theoretic, deductive and normative. Thus, this study aims at contributing to the clarification of the SSR concept by drawing conclusions from the "bottom up". It does so by answering both empirically and inductively to the questions of what the findings of the ten self-assessment papers written by the local experts mean for Romania and for the international community.

Reforming Romania's security sector: progress and problems

The main challenges specific to SSR in Romania come from its immediate historical legacy. For centuries, Romanians fought against the Tsarist, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires to unite their territory and to preserve their identity. This struggle cultivated a public very sensitive to external threats and relatively supportive of the military. Also, Ceaușescu's dictatorship – the fiercest among Eastern European states – exercised subjective civilian control of the military through Party and “Securitate” channels. That partially explains the violent revolution of 1989, where the Army, instead of defending the dictatorial regime, defended the population against the dictator, contributing to the overthrow of the Communist regime. Some Western experts expected the military to seize power and institute a military dictatorship. However, in an unexpected turn of events, the Army decided to support the fragile civilian government and transformed its mission and structure and instituted objective civilian control. A special group of young officers – the Action Committee for Democratization of the Army (CADA) – had an important role in igniting reform.

On the other hand, it is useful to mention that for about two decades during the Communist regime, from 1965 to 1980, Romania had very professional armed forces and intelligence services, a coherent doctrine of “the struggle of the people” and a well developed national defense industry. All of these structures were integrated in a systematic way. Thus, the challenge for Romania was how

to build a democratic SSR in an authoritarian type.

To sum up, there were four major elements in the process of reforming the Romanian security sector. First, the revolution of 1989 disrupted and dismantled the systemic structures of the authoritarian security sector and put the armed forces and defense in the spotlight of the reform process. A systematic approach to security captured the attention of policy-makers only in the late 1990s. Second, a tradition of politization of the security sector, mainly for the intelligence services and defense industry, was established. Thirdly, very much related to the previous issue, the legacy of a powerful president who had centralized power and controlled the military added to the popular expectation that one “wise man” should be in charge with this. Fourth, there was the legacy of a strong army, based on mass conscription.

Once Romania became a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and assumed the OSCE Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security (1994), the goals of reform became more clear and Western assistance to implement the reform became instrumental in assuring its success. However, the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of PfP and the program itself did not provide close supervision of SSR; instead they focused on defense issues, most particularly on peacekeeping operations.

NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) after 1999 helped create a consistent, clear and comprehensive approach to SSR. The new government after 2000 focused the reform process on the other shortcomings: poor and weakening dem-

ocratic control over the military, politization of the military, de-professionalization of the officer corps and insufficient professionalization of civilian experts.ⁱ The preparation for joining NATO and NATO's assessment teams furthered the agenda of reform beyond the classical concept of security sector and comprised even issues such as human rights, street children and human trafficking. Most papers have an institutional approach, presenting the norms and institutions involved in SSR, as well as the new system of security and defense planning. From those papers one can draw the conclusion that the spotlight of SSR was human resource management, participation in peacekeeping operations and building of a coherent system of planning in the security area.

The security sector reform issue facing Romania

The historical legacy has played an important role as a contextual factor for reforming the security sector. Problems generated by the historical heritage have previously been presented in a systematic way. It is worth adding that the obsession with external threats is deeply rooted in history and inflated by Ceaușescu's propaganda and was an important obstacle for initial SSR efforts. When policy-makers tried to adopt a strategic concept and coherent defense planning in the early 1990s, the experts and the public came up with a whole range of external threats that required “circular” defense and would have required the whole budget of 1994. For that reason the project was rejected by Parliament. This historical legacy has acted not only as an obstacle,

but also as a stimulus. Deeply rooted trust in the military, corroborated with the Army's contribution to overthrowing Ceaușescu's regime generated “social capital” that allowed leaders to pursue SSR.

Other factors that contributed to SSR could be grouped into international and internal factors. Among international factors, the most important included threat perception and the current international situation and the role of Western assistance. Since the Warsaw Pact and the bipolar world formally dissolved in 1991, the main external threats to Romania's security were those generated by regional conflicts such as those in Transnistria and the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, international requirements and assistance were essential in pursuing SSR.ⁱⁱ NATO's “open door policy”, particularly, and its PfP acted as an incentive for reform. They offered advice, guidance and some resources to pursue a democratic transition. Later on, the Stability Pact was the main institution coordinated by the European Union supporting “soft” security and regional cooperative security.

On the other hand, reform started on the military's initiative and domestic factors were fundamental. It was General Spiroiu, nominated as Minister of Defense in 1991, who stated that his role was to prepare the civilian control framework and to hand over the power to a civilian minister. Economic constraints and the tight budget contributed to the ultimate successes or failures of SSR. Consequently, SSR in Romania has been influenced by its peculiar historical legacy, by international influence and assis-

tance and by domestic factors. Among these, the role of internal factors has been too narrowly studied. It is presented more implicitly than explicitly and the role of economic development and public opinion support has not been addressed by the papers.

Social implications of security sector reform

In order to achieve good governance, civilian control and economic development, Romania had to implement tough reforms and such reforms were made at a great cost of the society. As argued earlier, before 1989 the security sector was very important, very large and integrated in a systematic way. But the revolution of 1989 required revolutionary changes. The first measures of de-communization and control over the Securitate affected the intelligence sector. While before 1989 it was only the Securitate (with three branches) that represented intelligence (and that was taken under military control later on), six smaller intelligence agencies were created. In 2002, the chiefs of SRI and SIE (domestic and foreign intelligence agencies) stated that only 20% of their personnel had worked under the Communist regime.

Also, the defense industry was integrated within the MoD, including procurement. Since the demands of the Romanian military decreased dramatically, the defense industry almost collapsed. Now some factories have been privatized, and others integrated into the Ministry of Industry. Most of the workers left the industry, either due to unemployment or in search of other jobs.

The military reduced its size from

320,000 in 1989 to 207,000 in 1999 and 140,000 in 2003, envisioning a further reduction to 90,000 military and civilians in 2007.ⁱⁱⁱ According to the same source, the number of colonels will be reduced from 2,300 to 630 and the number of lieutenant-colonels from 5,600 to 1,800 by the end of 2003. After 1997, the Concept of Human Resource Management was adopted to deal with restructuring. The Military Career Guide was adopted in 2001 to implement a professional re-conversion system. Professional re-conversion comprises both pre-retirement services and active measures of social protection. They are developed with NATO's assistance and the World Bank's financial support.^{iv}

The role of the international community

The international community, particularly international organizations such as NATO, OSCE and EU, has acted as an important factor in supporting, advising and directing Romania's SSR. Some bilateral assistance programs of the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy have also played important roles. The requirements of NATO's PfP Framework, the OSCE's Code of Conduct (1994) and the Study on NATO Enlargement stated clear criteria on democratization of civil-military relations and defense reform. They were focused mostly on "first-generation" issues. Later on, in 1999, the adopted Membership Action Plan had a comprehensive and systematic approach and produced deeper changes in Romania's security sector.

Some bilateral programs assured the training and education for both military

and civilian leaders and younger experts. Also, independent think tanks and foundations, such as RAND and CUBIC (USA) and DCAF (Switzerland), offered assistance, organized conferences, debates and delivered studies. Individual advisers from the UK, France and Germany attended the Defense Planning meetings and helped Romania prepare planning documents or reports for NATO. Lastly, civil society organizations prepared many programs and projects, with assistance from, among others, the EU's PHARE, the Stability Pact, the PfP Academic Consortium and OSCE. With respect to civil society, the Soros Foundation and other NGOs played an important role in training and helping the Romanian civil society.

Security sector reform priorities in Romania

The security sector reform is not an end in itself, but a long process which entails many stages. The first stage of SSR (1989-1992) began with the de-communization and downsizing of the armed forces. In the aftermath of the 1989 revolution, some of the first "revolutionary measures" involved the changing of commanders and the transfer of the Securitate's (secret service) control to the military and the withdrawal of the military as a free workforce in the national economy. The Action Committee for Democratization of the Army (CADA) played a key role in initiating changes. The most notable contribution to the institutionalization of democratic civilian control in this period was the establishment of the Country's Supreme Defense Council (CSAT). CSAT was established as

an agency for coordinating the conception and executive actions in crisis situations. The first stage was focused on debates and social and political anxieties. In the institutional field, it resulted in the adoption of Romania's Constitution, which clearly stated the democratic principles of governing, citizens' rights and liberties, institutions of state power and regulated/formalized the relations between them. Another contribution to the launching of the army's restructuring and reform was the signing, in 1990, of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) that set out to reduce armaments and the size of militaries.

The second stage, from 1992 to 1997, witnessed the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and Romania's desire to integrate into NATO. This, along with NATO's programs of assistance and the conditionality – inherent to the criteria of joining NATO – acted as an important factor influencing the establishment of civilian control and the Army's professionalization. During this time (in 1992), the National Defense College was established, aiming at preparing civilian experts in the security field, and a civilian deputy minister (Ioan Mircea Pașcu) was appointed in 1993. Then, a civilian Minister of Defense (Ambassador Gheorghe Tinca) was appointed, while a legal framework for democratic control and a reorganization of security institutions were adopted. Also in this period, Romania was the first Eastern European country to become a member of Partnership for Peace (PfP), in 1994. With PfP, interoperability programs and reforms were adopted (Planning and Review Process with its objectives of

interoperability). Moreover, Romania assumed the OSCE Code of Conduct, with a separate chapter dealing with the civilian control of armed forces (1994).

The third stage, between 1997 and 2000, marks the period when the coalition government of the Democratic Convention – the Democratic Party and UDMR came to power. After the failure of Madrid, when Romania was not invited to become a NATO member, the process of reform did not end – on the contrary, substantial improvements were made in the field of defense planning and in the military education system, with the adoption of the Emergency Decree on defense planning (1998) and the Concept of Human Resources (1997). Also, the security assistance programs have been intensified and a serious diplomatic effort has been carried out. An important determinant at this stage was the Washington Summit, through which the preparation of NATO candidates on the basis of an annual plan (Membership Action Plan) was proposed. Unfortunately, at the domestic level, divergences within the government coalition intensified and the electoral campaign was carried on, which led to the allotment of fewer financial resources for army reforms. Up to this stage, the agenda of reforms focused on the so-called “first generation issue”, reforms focused on armed forces, divesting means and troops, such as border guards or defense industry to other agencies. Intelligence agencies, the defense industry and the Ministry of Interior followed a parallel track of reforms, albeit at a slower pace.

The last stage began after the elections in November 2000, when power was

taken over by the Social Democrat Party. The approaching NATO Summit (Prague, 2002) and Romania’s expectations of becoming a full member acted as important stimuli for a focused effort of continued reform. To achieve consensus, on March 31, 2001, President Iliescu called for a meeting reuniting political parties, representatives of civil society and authorities in the city of Snagov, to sign “The Appeal – Declaration of NATO 2002 Forum”. Coherent measures to fulfill cycles II and III of the Membership Action Plan were taken, including improvement of the framework of civilian democratic control of the army. In the field of diplomacy, the successful handling of the OSCE presidency and the organization of the Summit V-10 “The Spring of New Allies” were important actions promoting Romania’s regional role and its image abroad. The Prague Summit, where Romania was invited to join NATO, was a turning point for SSR. The invitation allowed decision-makers to pursue an accelerated path of reform with an agenda specific to the second generation issue – good governance –, efficient institutions, adoption of the “Project Force-2007” (a force structure of 90,000 troops and focusing on modernizing reforms and procurement of NATO-compatible equipment).

Balanced vs. asymmetric reform developments

As presented, the early stages of reform were focused on the armed forces. A process of de-communization, downsizing, changing of role, missions and training system and education were at the top of the agenda. Early Parliaments focused

their attention on adopting norms, initiating constitutional changes that provided for democratic civilian control of the armed forces and intelligence. In the mid and late-nineties, the focus lay on restructuring the military organization and human resource management. These reforms were implemented quickly, the number of troops decreased from 230,000 in 1990 to 207,000 in 1999 and 140,000 in 2003. Currently, the reform focuses on the efficiency of those institutions. As Mihaela Matei wrote, Romania was a pioneer among Central and Eastern European countries in adopting a defense system, as of 1998.^v However, an integrated system of security planning was created only after 2000.

On the other hand, the re-organization of intelligence agencies started with the revolution of 1989. The Parliament, CSAT and government monitored these changes. The legislative framework of the functioning and control of these agencies was created very early, but the way the mechanism actually functions is a subject further to be studied. Later, after Romania began negotiations with the EU and the Stability Pact, the spotlight shifted towards other security sectors, such as the Ministry of the Interior (MI) (border control, demilitarization of MI, anti-corruption measures, etc). The initial focus was laid on the armed forces, as they had started the “revolutionary” measures on their own initiative. Moreover, the prospect of joining NATO with the related assistance programs helped focus attention, resources and know-how on ways to implement the reform. However, the declining economy was an obstacle to successful reform and governments prior-

itized the goals, focusing on downsizing, restructuring, adopting legal norms and human resources management. The asymmetrical focus can also be explained by the lack of knowledge and focus of the Western assistance (in fact the concept of SSR only emerged around the year 2000).

The role of civil society

A democratic society presupposes not only the separation of powers, but also the existence of informal mechanisms and non-governmental institutions, which indirectly affect civilian control. Institutions such as an independent press or NGOs and independent research institutes (think-tanks), contribute to the dissemination of information to civil society on security issues, thus creating expertise among civilians. During the Communist era, in Romania there was no independent movement or civil society. In our country, movements such as the “Solidarity” in Poland or the Czech “Charter 77” could have been created only with great difficulty.

According to Michael Sheehan, the role of NGOs and research institutes after the end of the Cold War is contributing to the building of peace and stability, through recommendations to and lobbying of governments, playing the role of democratic “watchdogs”, informing the public about security issues, and of building transnational networks of cooperation and research on security issues.^{vi} There are some organizations and foundations very active in the field of security policy, such as Casa NATO – Euro-Atlantic Council Romania, the Manfred Wörner Euro-Atlantic Association, the EURISC

Foundation, and the George C. Marshall Romania Association. However, the expertise of these organizations seems to be limited to organizing conferences and debates, their overall role in the elaboration of fundamental studies for security policy being limited.

An important aspect of democratic control related to civil society activities in the security sector is the creation of transparency. Together with political institutions of control and NGOs, an independent press is an important factor in preventing military abuse. Over the years, the press has acted as a genuine “watch-dog” of democracy, being considered as the fourth power within the state. The chapters written by Brigadier General Mihail Ionescu and Liviu Mureșan both address these issues complementarily. The former focuses on transparency and accountability from the point of view of governmental institutions, the latter focusing on the role of civil society.^{vii} As Liviu Mureșan puts it, the adoption of Law no. 544/2001 on free access to public information is fundamental in helping civil society address the transparency of decisions in the public administration field and its implementation is fundamental for Romania’s Euro-Atlantic integration.^{viii}

The role of the international community

In order to achieve SSR, Romania benefited from many multilateral and bilateral assistance programs, both for the military and civil society. At the bilateral level, one of the most important donors was the United States, through its early Mil-to-Mil, International Military

Education and Training and Foreign Military Funding (mostly for procurement). Among the most relevant for SSR was IMET (later E-IMET), which facilitated the attendance of Romanian officers and civilians in short-term and longer master programs in the US. Another important project that helped Romania and some other countries in the region prepare personnel for PSO was the British-sponsored Regional Center for PfP Training in Bucharest, whose courses were attended by more than 1,000 people.

At the multilateral level, NATO’s PfP program has been a sort of school for joining NATO, which Romanians regarded as vital for acquiring membership. PfP helped prepare the Army for PSOs and its utility was demonstrated by current Romanian participation in such operations. PfP also filled the gap of expertise for civilians and contributed to the professionalization of the military through conferences (organized under the PfP Academic Consortium aegis), seminars, courses and trainings at the NATO Defense College, the Marshall Center for Security Studies, NATO School (SHAPE), and through various military exercises and fellowships. By signing the “Framework Document” in 1994, Romania received a roadmap of reform and additional resources.

The European Union (EU), initially under the aegis of the WEU and later under the Stability Pact, also provided resources to further facilitate SSR in Romania. The role of each institution will be described in detail below. Many Western-sponsored institutions of regional cooperation have been established in

South-Eastern Europe, but still maintain regional ownership.

Among them is the South Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial Process (SEDM) aimed at contributing to regional security and stability and enhancing regional cooperation. The SEDM process brings together, under the same aegis, NATO and PfP countries. It provides participating nations with the necessary means to prove that they are evolving from the status of security consumers to that of security providers. The ten members are: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and the US. Since 2001, Ukraine has been an observer at ministerial meetings. SEDM built its military structure – the Multinational Peace Force South Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) and the South East European Brigade (SEEBRIC), a multinational regional security structure in South-Eastern Europe. Croatia, Slovenia and USA can also be counted as observers.

Another important cooperation program is the South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). SECI is not an assistance program in that it does not interfere with, but rather complements existing initiatives. SECI endeavors to promote closer cooperation among the governments of the region and to create new channels of communication among them. It was launched on the basis of “Points of Common EU-US Understanding”. It attempts to emphasize and coordinate region-wide planning, identify necessary follow-ups and missing links, provide for better involvement of the private sector in regional economic

and environmental efforts, help create a regional climate that encourages the transfer of know-how and greater investment in the private sector, and assist in harmonizing trade laws and policies. Participating states in the SECI include: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and, as of December 2000, Serbia and Montenegro. It is based in Bucharest and has gained increasing importance and recognition after the September 11, 2001.

Regional implications of the security sector reform

Romania defines itself as a bridge between Central Europe, the Balkans and the Caucasus. Its strategic vision provides for the special task of deploying peace-keeping troops and participating in PSOs at both regional and global levels. Since the Balkans were seen as Europe’s powder keg and the wars in former Yugoslavia could have spread instability in the region, the main measures taken by South-East European countries and supported by the international community were adopting confidence-building measures (CBM).

SSR is one of the most important measures, as downsizing the armed forces, restructuring and building common units contribute to an increased level of trust and reduce the security dilemma. Several states in the region built special initiatives, such as the South-East Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM-1996), in order to intensify political military cooperation with its most important project of

Multinational Peace Force in South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) – a brigade level unit. The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACK-SEAFOR) and SECI Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime were other initiatives.^{ix}

The bilateral agreements and units, such as the Romanian-Hungarian Battalion were also very important. The most recent initiative was the Stability Pact, whose aim is to encourage and strengthen cooperation between the countries in the region. All these institutions and networks were created to foster trust and achieve regional security. It is important to realize that the networks and initiatives were created at the suggestion and with the support of the international community. Therefore, one must be aware that the problem is their long-term sustainability. NATO's and the EU's "open door policies" might be successful endeavors; the focus on a coherent SSR would be also very useful.

Issues not covered by the self-assessment studies

Basically, the studies represent huge documentation and research efforts. For a country like Romania there is a severe shortage of studies on civil-military relations and SSR. However, they exist without clear thesis statements or clearly drawn conclusions. Many papers present the laws and institutions of democratic control very descriptively, but lacking further explanatory details. Moreover, the SSR is a process and each paper should have regarded reform as a process, not simply present the current *status quo*.

The most important shortcoming is the

fact that most of the papers focus on defense, but do not analyze the reform of troops, border guards and the defense industry. Moreover, there is further need for describing the mechanisms of oversight for intelligence agencies.

Systematic aspects of the self-assessment studies

The SSR issue is vast, but this study only presented a part of the specific situation in Romania. The next part will focus on important topics, such as expert education, monitoring of SSR, cooperation programs and the types of advisory boards and panels applicable for SSR.

Expert education is one of the most important topics of SSR. By experts we mean professional actors involved in the process, including military and civilians. The chapter on military and civilian training on defense issues^x presents the changing pattern of education and training for military and civilians in defense and security issues.

The problem of how to change the military education system has been raised since the early 1990s, when the Department of Education, Science and Culture was established. It contributed to eliminating ideological elements from the curricula, reorganizing military schools, and establishing compatibility between military and civilian education.

In 1995, a "Concept on the Reorganization and Modernization of Military Education" was adopted, triggering very fundamental educational reforms. Further measures were adopted with assistance from the US, UK, France and the Netherlands, such as the adoption of the "Concept on Human Resource

Management". The main goal of the Concept was to modernize the human resource management sector in accordance with NATO standards and restructure the personnel. Two important proposals were the project to create a Military Career Guide (adopted in 2001) and the project on Re-Conversion of Redundant Personnel.^{xi} The necessity of interoperability with NATO led to the creation of new institutions, such as the Regional Center for the Management of Defense Resources (Braşov), the Regional Center for PfP Training (Bucharest) and centers for foreign language education. The goal of joining NATO required the Leadership and Human Resource Department to launch the Concept on Military and Civilian Personnel Training for Taking over Positions in NATO Structures (2002).

The main problem for Eastern Europe as a whole, including Romania, is the training and forming of civilian experts who take over high and middle level positions in the security sector, according to the principles of civilian control. The lack of security expertise among civilians was generally an important obstacle in building an efficient mechanism of civilian control and SSR. An important step was made in 1992, when the MoD established the National Defense College in order to train both military and civilians in strategic and defense issues, two-thirds of the thirty students being civilians. Until last year, 266 out of 499 graduates of the College were civilians who occupied leadership positions in the security sector or worked as journalists. Another way of training civilians in defense issues was through Western assistance in such pro-

grams as IMET (US), the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, the NATO School in Oberammergau or other schools in the US, UK, France and Germany. Last year, special programs on security and defense (master degrees) were introduced at the University of Bucharest and National School for Political and Administrative Studies.

Monitoring the security sector reform

Monitoring the reform process is an issue of vital importance. Many plans and strategies were designed and developed over the last thirteen years; many ended up where they began – on paper. One advantage for Romania is the fact that the reform was initiated from within the military and supported by the population. The establishment of the CSAT was an important step in creating an administrative agency responsible for organizing and coordinating all activities related to security and defense. As Romania is a semi-presidential republic, the ultimate word on oversight belongs not to the Parliament, but to the CSAT, chaired by the President, which has proposed, advised and supervised most of the reform measures in the security sector. Even if the MoD, intelligence agencies or MI presented reform projects, they were all equally debated within the CSAT. Likewise, the Parliament's Committees for defense, public order and national security have played an important role in monitoring the reform measures.

However, a communication breakdown among agencies and criticism of a competition between CSCD and the

Government impeded coherent and smooth SSR implementation. After the Washington Summit (1999) adopted the Membership Action Plan and the issue of SSR was raised as such, the managing reform became more complex. Therefore, a special Inter-Departmental Commission for NATO Integration was created in 2000, tasked with coordinating, in a standardized format, domestic and overseas activities related to NATO integration, preparing evaluation reports on and submitting proposals for the implementation of the National Strategy to the Supreme Defense Council. In February 2001 a National Commission for Romania's NATO integration took up the responsibility and provided new impetus to the reforms.

On the other hand, Western assistance grew over the years and the role of advice and assistance, both multilateral and bilateral, became very important. Romania has a lot of programs and foreign advisers but does not have a board or panel to coordinate them in an integrated and effective way.

Conclusion

Romania's SSR is now "locally-owned" to a certain extent, but no important steps could have been achieved without the role of Western assistance. One should look at Latin American countries or the former Soviet countries to see the difference of outcomes in transitions. While many projects and programs contributed to (the relative) success of SSR, including international NGOs such as the Soros Foundation (which supported civil society's right to control state institutions including the military), many ultimately

proved marginally useful to SSR.

Romania's invitation to become a NATO member in November 2002 in Prague can be considered a major success not only for the Government but also for the society as a whole. In fact, over the last decade, NATO and EU integration have been the major goals of Romania's foreign policy. Romania's vision of these two goals does not conflict, as they are considered to be parallel tracks towards the same goal – the modernization of Romania and its anchoring to the West. Therefore, these two organizations are the most important for the SSR field.

The EU initially contributed in supporting a broad approach of the reform, both under the PHARE and WEU programs. The invitation to start accession negotiations in 1999 brought a new impetus and broader approach to SSR reform. Among the thirty-one negotiations chapters, several (such as Justice and Internal Affairs) and programs (such as PHARE) are related to the security sector. However, the most important EU project remains the Stability Pact, which was established after the Kosovo crisis in 1999, as a political initiative to encourage cooperation among South-East European countries, as well as to streamline assistance efforts. The three Working Tables, especially the one on the security sector, with its two sub-tables on Defense and Security and Justice and Home Affairs, are the most suitable to coordinate the efforts of SSR in South-East Europe. The reform was also assisted by projects such as the Stability Pact-ISN-DCAF South Eastern Europe Documentation Network (www.seedon.org), with its inventory of initiatives and documents, which have

provided good informative steps towards a coherent policy in the region. However, Romania is at a different stage of reform (one could say a "second-generation" agenda) and the majority of SSR projects involved the Western Balkans alone, with some on "soft" security involving Romania.

NATO's open door policy and the PFP were of utmost importance in Romania. Although politicians claim that Romania does not comply with NATO, it was clear that the focus of reform and allocated resources were directed towards this end. Many aspects on the role of Partnership Work Program (PWP), Planning and Review Process (PARP) or the Membership Action Plan in Romania have been mentioned in the previous chapters.

Although the OSCE played an important role in the democratization of Romania during the early 1990s, including establishing improved inter-ethnic relations, the most important achievement was the Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security. Currently, Romania has "graduated" in implementing these conditions and legal frameworks and has a different set of problems than those other Balkan countries are now confronted with. Within the OSCE, Romania played an important leadership role as Chairman-in-Office of the Troika in 2001, substantially contributing to the peace process in FYROM.

Two other important international institutions marginally involved in SSR in Romania were the UN and the World Bank. Romania not only transformed its involvement in PSOs authorized and coordinated by the UN Security Council,

but also benefited from the establishment of a UNDP branch in Romania dedicated to achieving good governance. The World Bank has been involved in the project of re-conversion of the redundant military both in Romania and Bulgaria.

A striking conclusion drawn by the Stability Pact's self-assessment papers is the overall lack of coordination among international actors within the area of security sector reform. Therefore, some policy recommendations coming from the shortcomings earlier presented should be drawn both for Romanian policy-makers and donors.

Recommendations for international institutions

Firstly, professionalization of the armed forces according to NATO standards and further reform of the Interior Forces and Intelligence are key priorities. NATO should continue efforts to monitor and assess through its MAP process until Romania is fully integrated (most likely in 2004). Although NATO has extended its strategic concept and some transatlantic disagreements still exist, NATO should be in charge mostly with monitoring defense reform and coordinating and supervising of "collateral" reforms in the area of counter-terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime.

Secondly, there is a need to establish a SSR sub-table under the Stability Pact's WT III, instead of the two sub-tables. That will make reforms more coherent. The issues should be treated differently for Romania, Slovenia and Bulgaria, already invited to joined NATO, and the rest of the countries that are in a different stage of reform (first-generation agen-

da). Besides the Western assistance, the “lessons learned” from NATO invitees and expertise should be transferred to the other countries.

Thirdly, a Security Sector Reform Advisory Board should be established, by transforming the National Commission for Integration in NATO. The experience and coordination gained during the MAP process would be useful. It could be under the Prime Minister’s supervision, who should report to the CSAT. Within this commission, a Working Group/Panel of Foreign Advisers should be established to avoid duplication and improve coordination of bilateral and multilateral assistance.

Finally, the analytical capacity of civil society should be strengthened. Romanian think tanks lack the expertise to undertake research, write research papers and offer policy advice. The Stability Pact could organize support and assistance to improve the analytic capacity of Romanian think tanks and/or universities. The UNDP and EU could contribute with resources and well-established institutions, such as DCAF, could provide training and advice.

Endnotes:

ⁱ See Ioan M. Pașcu, “Romanian Military Reform and NATO Integration”, in Larry Watts, (ed.), *Romanian Military Reform and NATO Integration*, (Bucharest: Center for Romanian Studies, 2002), p. 26.

ⁱⁱ Marian Zulean, “International Requirements and Assistance for Defense and Security Reform”, in Philipp H. Fluri and Jan A. Trapans (eds.), *Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives Volume 2; FYROM Macedonia; Moldova; Romania; A Self-Assessment Study*, (Belgrade: CCMR, 2003), pp. 405-415.

ⁱⁱⁱ Marian Zulean, “Professionalization of Romanian Armed Forces”, in Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, *The Challenge of Military Reform in Post-Communist Europe*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 121.

^{iv} George Maior, “Personnel Management and Reconversion”, in Watts, (ed.), *Romanian Military Reform*, p. 79.

^v Mihaela Matei, “Defense Planning: System Building, The Role of the Armed Forces and Civilian Control”, in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defense and Security*, Vol. 2, p. 343.

^{vi} Michael Sheehan, “The Role of NGOs in Building Security in South Eastern Europe”, *Central European Issues*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999/2000, p. 44-49.

^{vii} Mihail Ionescu, “Transparency and Accountability”, and Liviu Mureșan, “Security Sector Reform in Romania”, in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defense and Security*, Vol. 2, pp. 379-391 and pp. 303-312.

^{viii} Liviu Mureșan, “Security Sector Reform in Romania”, in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defense and Security*, Vol. 2, p. 310.

^{ix} For a comprehensive presentation of those initiatives see Nicolae Cotoară and Marin Bănică, “Peacekeeping and Regional Security”, in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defense and Security*, Vol. 2, pp. 417-430.

^x Iulian Fota, “From Democratic Reform to Good Governance: Military and Civil Training on Defense Issues”, in Fluri and Trapans (eds.), *Defense and Security*, Vol. 2, pp. 367-378.

^{xi} See Marian Zulean, “Professionalization of Romanian Armed Forces”, in Cottey, Forster, and Edmunds, *Challenge of Military Reform*, pp. 123-124. See also Marian Zulean, “Changing Civil-Military Relations in Eastern Europe: The Case of Romania”, in Gerhard Kümmel and Wilfried von Bredow, *Civil Military Relations in an Age of Turbulence: Armed Forces and the Problem of Democratic Control*, (Strausberg, October 2000) available at http://www.sowibundeswehr.de/Forum_21.pdf

Marian Zulean

Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in South-Eastern Europe

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Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, South-Eastern European countries have done tremendous efforts to build market economies and democratic institutions. An important issue of their democratization was considered to be the reform of the armed forces and democratization of civil-military relations. Thus, the civilian control of armed forces and building of democratic control-mechanisms are seen as important indicators of democratization.

However, South-Eastern Europe is an area where civilizations have clashed over

the centuries, triggering a spillover of the conflicts in the region. Not long ago, the Balkan region was called “the powder keg” of Europe due to so many local wars and the ignition of two world wars. The twentieth century started with the Balkan Wars and ended with the Kosovo intervention. The perception of South-Eastern Europe as a problematic and laggard area produced a runaway policy of eliminating this labelⁱⁱ.

But in the late 1990s, Western leaders showed the commitment to put an end to conflicts in the Balkans and to re-affirm

that NATO's doors are open for aspirant countries willing to embrace Western democratic values of governance. In order to assist them and to evaluate their progress, NATO launched a Membership Action Plan that requires, among others, the establishment of a democratic civil-military pattern. Finally, the reform process, assisted by the West, led to the invitation of three South-Eastern Europe countries – Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia – to be NATO members, in November 2002.

Since a democratic civil-military pattern was an important test for political developments of aspirant countries, this study will enable us to track the progress of these countries in their effort to join NATO. However, the literature dealing with civil-military relations, in general, and Eastern European transitions, in particular, although extensive, has focused mostly on the Visegrad group (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland). Only a few of them refer to South-Eastern Europe. There were some early studies, written by Daniel Nelson, Ronald Linden, Constantine Danopoulos, James Gow, or Anton Bebler but they had a narrow focus, either on specific issues of civil-military relations or on a particular country. Over the last three years, authors such as J. Callaghan and J. Kuhlman or a group of British researchers, such as A. Cottey, T. Edmunds and A. Forester, have coordinated collective research projects on Eastern Europe, with the help of local expertsⁱⁱⁱ. However, none of them represents a comparative study. This study aims at filling the gap in understanding South-East European transition by pro-

viding a comparative study on how Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia succeeded to change civil-military patterns and on the role of Western assistance in this process.

The dynamics of civil-military relations in South-Eastern Europe

This study considers the democratic civil-military relations as a complex mechanism of democratic control of the army, of exerting the civilian oversight by the democratically elected politicians and the existence of a professional army that functions as an expert organization for defending the state. This is an operational definition, based on the findings of a collective research endeavor, coordinated by Cottey, Edmunds and Forester and in which the author was an active participant. Starting from this definition, the study enables us to follow the transition process regarding two vectors, respectively:

I. A vector related to society (the setting up of the democratic oversight mechanism);

II. A vector related to the professionalization of the military institution (how the armed forces internalized the norms of democratic control).

The Civilian Democratic Control (CDC)

This part of the paper describes the setting up of the constitutional and legal framework of civilian democratic control, the specific institutions for exerting the control, and the control mechanisms in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.

Bulgaria

a. The legislative framework regarding the democratic civilian control

The transformation of the Bulgarian legislative and constitutional framework began at a slow pace and accelerated after 1997. Between 1989 and 1991, the opposition has fiercely criticized the armed forces as being a partisan instrument of the Socialist Party, continuator of the former communist party. The adoption of the Constitution in 1991 set up the democratic frame of democratic control, established the separation of powers and forbade the ties of armed forces with political parties. According to the Constitution, the role of the armed forces is “to guarantee the sovereignty, security, independence and territorial integrity of Bulgaria”^{iv}. Also, the Constitution established the role of the Parliament (Narodno Sabranie), President, Council of Ministers and Judiciary in relation with the military. The legal framework of democratic control of the armed forces was completed through organic laws and other official documents. The Law of Defense, introduced in 1996 requires the minister of Defense and deputies to be civilians and subordinate to the General Staff. In 1994, a Law of the Consultative National Security Council established a consultative body on national security issues chaired by the President^v. The defense legislation has been improved after the MAP requirements emerged.

b. Institutions of democratic civilian controlⁱ

The *National Assembly* (Narodno Sabranie) is the main institution for the control of the armed forces and other security sector bodies through its legisla-

tive activity, commissions and defense budget approval. It not only adopts the defense legislation, but also has the right to declare war; it approves the deployment of troops, ratifies and rejects treaties, and adopts the Security Concept, Military Doctrine and other long-term programs for the military.

The *President* of Bulgaria is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and the president of the Consultative Council for National Security. Also, he oversees the activities of the secret services and can declare general and partial mobilization. While a martial law is into being, the President must form Supreme Headquarters, whose staff assist him in defense matters.

The *Council of Ministers* (Government) has the most important power in implementing defense policy. The Minister of Defense is a civilian politician in charge with the development of the National Security Concept, drafting the military budget, personnel policy and implementing general control over the military.

Romania

a. The legislative framework regarding the democratic civil control

Romania's Constitution stipulates that the army is exclusively subordinated to the people's will, in order to guarantee the country's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and constitutional democracy (amendments to the Constitution were added in 2002). The Law on national defense completes the Constitution and defines the fundamental principles of accomplishing national defense, the structure of national system of defense, and the public authorities'

tasks in the field of defense. There are many debates and unsolved problems related to the Emergency decree (ED) no. 1/1999 on the conditions of the state of siege and the state of emergency, as well as to the Law no. 39/1990 on CSAT's organization and functioning.

After postponements, Emergency decree no. 1/1999 was adopted in few hours, under the pressure of the events generated by the miners' revolt of January 1999. Besides the procedural aspects, regarding the lack of debate within the Parliament, the Emergency decree does not fully comply with the constitutional provisions that regulate the exceptional states, having a compendious content, with essential shortcomings regarding the attributions of the bodies involved in crisis situations^{vii}. From the point of view of civil-military relations, it should be noticed that this decree provides increased attributions for the militaries. Even if these attributions are dictated by crisis situations, they should be clearly regulated and framed into a period of time; otherwise, they would present a risk for the democratic civil control.

b. Institutions of democratic civilian control^{viii}.

The *Parliament* issues laws on national defense, varying from the organization of the Ministry of Defense and of the armed forces to the procedures of defense planning and social protection. The Parliament exerts its authority by asking for reports on the military programs and activities and through the mediation of its commissions for defense, public order, and national safety. The role of the commissions is very important in promoting the laws on national defense and

security, and also in the approval of the budget.

It also convokes the officials of the government, as well as the minister of National Defense, to answer to specific questions regarding Romania's national security and approves the defense budgets. The defense expenditures are transparent for the public authorities democratically elected, including the Parliament. For exercising an efficient control, the problems related to the staffing of the commissions with civilian professional experts must be solved, but there are also problems in avoiding the Legislative by the Executive in order to promote certain laws. Along the same line, Ioan Mircea Pașcu, at that time (1999) president of the House of Deputies' Commission for defense of public order and national safety, saw three obstacles in perfecting the functioning of the parliamentary control: the lack of clear regulations regarding the relation with other institutions with control responsibilities, militaries' lack of initiative in reporting to the Parliament, and the lack of independent expertise of parliamentary commissions, being thus dependent on the governmental agencies^{ix}.

The *President* of the country represents the Romanian State and is the guarantor of the country's independence, unity and territorial integrity. He is the Supreme Commander and president of the Country's Supreme Defense Council (CSAT), position that confers him a major influence on issues of national security, such as: the declaration of the state of mobilization or of siege. CSAT organizes and coordinates, in a unitary way, the

activities related to national defense and safety. Decisions within this agency are taken by a group of ten persons, led by the President of Romania. The modification of CSAT's structure reflects the dynamic of the "civil control". If in 1990 CSAT included only five civilians out of ten, after 1997 only the chief of the General Staff is a military officer. The counselor on security issues, the directors of the Intelligence Services (SRI and SIE) are directly subordinated to the President and the chief of the General Staff is indirectly subordinated to the President, as the Supreme Commander, while the other five are ministers, members of the Government. This fact generates the perception of the existence of "two governments"^x.

The *Prime Minister* is the vice-president of CSAT and chief of the Civil Protection. On the other side, the prime minister leads the Government's executive activity and implements the defense policy, through the mediation of the Minister of Defense. The General Staff is part of the Ministry of Defense and subordinated to the civilian minister of Defense.

The *judicial power*, through its various institutions, has an important role in the control of the army. The Constitutional Court is an institution that guarantees the supremacy of the Constitution and treats the army as any other institution, verifying the constitutionality of the normative documents related to defense. The Accounting Court is responsible for controlling the spending of public money and the People's Advocate has an important role in defending citizens' rights and liberties. An issue intensely debated at

the beginning of the last decade was that of maintaining the military court and military prosecutors, finalized with the decision of keeping these institutions.

Slovenia

a. The legislative framework regarding the democratic civil control

The legislation on civilian control of armed forces has been put in place immediately after gaining independence and departure of the last "Yugoslav military" (September 1991). The Slovenian Constitution, adopted in December 1991, stipulates general defense commitments for citizens and parliamentary control in execution of defense. Article 124 states a specific Slovenian provision that Slovenia's defense "stems from peace policy and the culture of non-violence" that was included by the ecologists^{xi}. The Law of Defense (known as Defense Act and modified in 1994) clearly establishes the role of the Parliament in approving declarations of war or the status of emergency, defines the size and organization of the Armed Forces.

b. Institutions of democratic civilian control^{xii}

Unlike Romania and Bulgaria, Slovenia had to start building the military and political institutions from scratch. The *Parliament* (National Assembly) defines the security policy and exercises the democratic control over the AF, through Defense Committee, Committee on Budget and Finance, Committee for the Control of Intelligence and the Committee for Control of the Achievement of National Security Resolution.

The *President* is the commander-in-

chief of the SAF while the *Prime-minister* chairs the National Security Council but has no specific powers in that area. The Government has the executive role and is accountable for keeping the unity and concordance of defense forces according to national security and defense policy. The Minister of Defense is a political civilian appointee and has the key role in defense policy.

What is specific to the Slovenian case is the important role played by the *Ombudsman*, who is responsible for monitoring and implementing human rights protection in the defense sector. Also, beside internal audit of MoD the *Court of Audit* of the central government can exercise the financial control of the military.

Mechanisms of democratic control

Above, it has been presented the setting up of the legal framework for the democratic civil control and the specific political institutions in charge with that. The juridical substantiation of the democratic civil control of the armed forces has its origins in the post-communist Constitutions. According to the post-Communist Constitutions, all of the three public powers, executive, legislative and judiciary, have responsibilities in monitoring and overseeing the army. Of all the forms of democratic control, the Parliament's role is the most complex one.

The most important mechanism of control is the control of the **budgetary allocations**, which include planning, budgeting, and acquisition system (before 1989, the military budget was a state secret). The improvement of this type of control

was delayed due to uncertain provisions on the increase of GDP and to the impossibility of implementing the multi-annual budgets, according to NATO standards. For the Romanian case, another impediment for implementing the mechanism of budget control was that of the existence of the defense industry, with an extraordinary power inherited from the communist period and the influence over the General Staff, the intelligence services or at political level. However, a new system of planning, programming, and budgeting (PPBES) was implemented after 2001, and the task of the defense integrated planning was completely passed under the control of the civilian minister, through the absorption of the General Staff's Department of Strategic Planning by the Department of Defense Integrated Planning, subordinated to the State Secretary for Defense Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration and through the establishment of the Council of Defense Planning, under the leadership of the minister. The defense budget is public today and subject to internal audit, as well as to the oversight of other institutions, such as the Minister of Finance, parliamentary commissions or Accounts Courts.

Another important mechanism of democratic civilian control is related with to issue of **transparency**^{xiii}. Besides the mechanism of budget control, transparency (external and domestic) seems to be the second most important mechanism for the civilian control of the military. External transparency refers to the exchange of information among governments, while domestic transparency is related to the accountability of govern-

ments to their constituencies. The issue of transparency in defense matters has received greater importance in Southeastern Europe after the adoption of the Stability Pact. Thus a Budget Transparency Initiative (BTI) obtained an endorsement of the Third Working Table of the Stability Pact, in October 2000, which later constituted an Academic Working Group in Vienna to provide guidance for a pilot compilation of "Yearbook on South-East European Defense Spending"^{xiv}. Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia are implementing the mechanisms of PPBS that requires internal accountability of planning and budgeting.

Democracy presupposes the separation of powers. That is why we studied the setting of the legislative framework and presented the political, legislative, executive and judicial institutions, which directly control the armed forces. In spite of all these, a democratic society presupposes the existence of some informal mechanisms and of some non-state institutions for achieving the indirect civil control, organizations of "civil society". Institutions such as an independent press or non-governmental institutions and independent institutes of research (think-tanks), contribute to the wide information of civil society on issues of security and create an expertise of civilians.

The watchdog that makes governments accountable is the civil society and the media is an instrument of it. Together with the political institutions of control, the independent media is an important obstacle against the army's abuses. Over these years, the media has acted as a genuine "watchdog" of democracy, being considered the fourth power in state.

As far as civil society is concerned, during the communist period there were no independent movements or civil society in Southeastern Europe. Movements such as the Polish's "Solidarnosc" or the Czech's "Chart 77" were difficult to be created in Romania or Bulgaria. After 1989, we witnessed an explosive emergence of non-governmental organizations (NGO), most of them being based on external funding. Many of the local NGOs have collateral economic objectives, such as buying foreign cars without custom duties; however, it is not the aim of this study to examine the quality and missions of these institutions^{xv}. Instead we will focus on NGOs' role in influencing the security policy and in building democratic civil-military relations.

Thus, Michael Sheehan sees the role of NGOs and research institutes, after the end of the Cold War, as being that of contributing to the building of peace and stability, through recommendations and lobby over the governments, of playing a role of "watchdog" of democracy, of informing the public opinion on security issues and of building trans-national networks of cooperation and research on security issues^{xvi}.

In the last decade there functioned many non-governmental organizations concerned with security policy, army's reform, and civil-military relations; yet, many of them functioning ad-hoc entered into self-dissolution as the external funding of the project ceased, the problem concerning them was solved or disappeared from the public agenda^{xvii}. In spite of all these, the expertise of these organizations seems to be limited to conferences and debates, their role in the elab-

oration of some fundamental studies for security policy being restricted.

I have described the normative institutional aspects of the establishment of democratic civil control of Romanian army. Yet, the democratic control presupposes a bi-univocal relation; the other aspect depends on the army's commitment to fulfill the missions established by democratically elected politicians, army's professionalization, and the internalization of the norms of civilian control.

The professionalization of the military

Professionalization of armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe is an integral element of the democratization of civil-military relations and democratization of society as a whole. A literature review reveals two approaches to the issue of professionalization. In the work of Morris Janowitz, professionalization is a descriptive term for the processes of professional soldiers' socialization^{xviii}. In contrast, the political science approach utilizes 'professionalization' as a specifically normative term to describe armed forces, which fulfill the demands of a legitimate government in efficient manner. Marybeth Ulrich also draws an important distinction between military professionalism and democratic military professionalism. In view of this study, a professional army is defined as a military organization which accepts that its role is to fulfill the legitimate government's demands and which is capable of fulfilling efficiently the specific military activities^{xix}. Therefore, a professional army carries out the following characteristics: clearly defined missions, maintaining a specific

expertise of combat, clear rules regarding the responsibilities of the army as institution and those of the soldier, as well as promotion on the basis of merit. This chapter describes the transformation of the role, expertise, structures, training, and education of the RAF after 1989. We identified three vectors of the process of professionalization:

- the changing of the role, missions and the system of defense planning;
- the restructuring of the military organization;
- the changes to the system of military education and training.

Bulgaria

a. Changing of the role, missions and defense planning system

Unlike Romania, Bulgaria has been a very loyal Warsaw Pact ally. The primary mission of the Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) was the defense of socialism, with the assigned task of defending the south-eastern border of WTO. Some Western thinkers considered that although democratic transition began in 1989, it was only after 1997 that political institutions could be considered operational^{xx}. The Constitution of 1991 changed the supreme mission of BAF to be a "guarantor the sovereignty, security and independence of the country". By signing the PfP Framework Document, Bulgaria signaled that it had assumed the democratic missions for the Army and could orient towards the West. The new missions and role of BAF were developed through two important documents: National Security Concept and Military Doctrine.

The *National Security Concept* (NSC)^{xxi}, adopted in April 1998, identi-

fied the BAF among the principle guarantors of national security, engaged the government to place required resources, stated the civilian control of security sectors and expanded the framework of civil-military responsibilities outlined earlier in the Constitution. The Council of Ministers is in charge of assessing risks, developing strategies and allocating resources. It is assisted by the Security Council, a body comprising, among others, the Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior Ministers, chief of General Staff. The President could always participate to the work of the Military Doctrine Council. The NSC defines the principles of the Military Doctrine.

The *Military Doctrine*^{xxii} extends the missions of BAF. The deterrence and defense of the territory missions are complemented by peacekeeping, humanitarian as well as search and rescue missions plus the social functions (creating the feeling of security for citizens, patriotic education and strengthening the ethnic cohesion).

Although Bulgaria doesn't have a defense planning law, the process is done in a similar way as in Romania. National Security Concept, Military Strategy and Military Doctrine are basic documents for the planning of Defense. A defense resources planning and management system has been successfully introduced in the past years. In 2000, the Ministry of Defense undertook the implementation of the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) compatible with NATO planning systems and introduced a 6-year cycle of indicative planning, according to the regularity adopted in the Alliance.

Apart from establishing a rational mechanism for defense resources planning and management, the system provides the favorable conditions for an effective civilian control on the appropriateness of the Defense Ministry's budget spending, and transparency of all activity undertaken in the Armed Forces sector.

The White Paper on Defense, adopted in 2001, and the Concept of PPBS brought some coherence to the criticized lack of holistic approach to defense planning. According to the recently adopted White Paper on Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria^{xxiii}, the BAF's missions are grouped as such: *peacetime contribution to national security, contribution to global peace and security and participation to national defense*. The reorganization and tactics of defense planning are drawn from the Plan 2004 and Plan 2010 that will be discussed below.

b. The structural change of BAF

The reform of the military structure was planned through a medium term plan, Plan 2004, and a long term one, Plan 2010. The General Staff suggested and promoted first the Plan 2010 that was approved by the Kostov Government in 1997. After two years, the MoD initiated an evaluation of the approach and timetable for Plan 2010, a working group under the direction of Deputy Minister Shalamanov with the methodological assistance of the US MG Henry Kivenaar and British General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie. The conclusions were that the Plan doesn't meet the Military Doctrine model and doesn't fit into the new security environment. Based on that, the Minister of Defense Ananiev sent a set of recommendations to the General

Staff to prepare Plan 2004 by 1999. The main goals of Plan 2004 are: to make BAF adequate for the strategic environment, have a high level of interoperability with NATO, have a potential efficient contribution to Peace Support Operations and have a realistic size in accordance with resources^{xxiv}. According to the White Paper, the Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria^{xxv} consists of the General Staff, Land Forces, Air Force, Navy formations and units under central subordination.

The *General Staff* is the basic body that provides management of the Bulgarian Armed Forces during peace and wartime. The activities and functions of the General Staff provide the Armed Forces' management and the implementation of the tasks, laid down in all national security and defense documents.

The *Land Forces* are a basic service in the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Their prime function is to guarantee, in interaction with the other services, the country's sovereignty and independence and protect its territorial integrity. The *Air Force* is a service that contributes to neutralizing risk factors and actively shaping a favorable national security environment. The *Navy's* function is to guarantee Bulgaria's sovereignty in its territorial waters and, whenever necessary, take part in operations other than war. The Navy carries out tasks of guaranteeing the safety of navigation within the economic zone of our country's territorial waters.

In compliance with the Military Doctrine, the troops and units of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in functional terms consist of Active Forces and

Reserve Forces. The *Active Forces* comprise the Deployable Forces and In-place Forces with a peacetime personnel of 34,000. The *Reserve Forces* comprise the Augmentation Forces and Territorial Defense Forces and training bases, with peacetime personnel up to 11,000. The Territorial Defense Forces are formations of Land Forces, set up with the Supreme High Command's resolution.

c. Changing the system of education and training

Bulgarian policy makers were aware of the problems of human resources management and a new system of education very early but, over the early 1990s, efforts were made to streamline the AF and reconversion. *A Concept for training of the military personnel for Defense* has been adopted late in 2000.

According to that Concept, military education of officers is organized on three levels: the first level is at the National Military University (comprising 4 colleges), the second level is carried out at the Faculty of Interoperability at the "Rakovski" Military Academy and the third one takes place at the same military academy, National Security Department (for strategic level officers)^{xxvi}.

The education of enlisted sergeants is done in the first year by training in special centers. Selection is made from enlisted soldiers, civilian employees and conscripts who passed two thirds of mandatory service. In September 2000, the Minister of Defense passed the order "Main trends for professionalization of BAF"^{xxvii}, which contains a promoting campaign for enlistment, measures to improve the selection of candidates and outlined the priorities and stages to

achieve a professional BAF. During the first stage (by 2004), the Immediate Operation units of Rapid Reaction Force from the Army and parts of Rapid Reaction Forces of Marine and Air Force would be filled with professionals. Over the next stage (by 2010), all Rapid Reaction Forces would be professional and the third stage (by 2015) BAF would be fully professional.

On the other hand, new personnel policy presupposes the gradual implementation of the principles of openness, rotation and democracy. A maximum term of holding the same job for five years and minimum term of holding the same rank have been introduced^{xxviii}. A special attention has been paid to language training and study abroad. By 2001, 1,543 persons from MoD have been issued certificates for command of foreign language following STANAG 6001 and a total of 584 persons have been trained abroad^{xxix}.

Romania

a. Changing of the role, missions and defense planning system

In the communist period, Romania had a relatively well-structured defense policy, whose main goal was the defense of the country's territorial borders. Considering the extended definition of military professionalism, we could assert that, for almost two decades, except the last years of Ceaușescu's dictatorship, Romanian armed forces were professional, but professional in an authoritarian manner. Of course, the issue of individual professionalism is debatable. Thus, the promotion on the basis of merit coexisted together with the promotion on political and nepotism criteria. As a

result, the main task of the political and military elite after 1989 was to replace the authoritarian pattern of professionalization with a democratic one. Until 1994, when Romania applied for membership of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), both military and political establishments had been seeking new strategic concepts and military doctrines. In 1994, a *National Integrated Security Concept* and *Military Doctrine* had emerged, but in practice, both of these were somehow confuse, identifying a large number of security risks but with no clear rationale of how these should be addressed by the RAF. As a result, these documents were not ratified by parliament, and were sent back to the Ministry of Defense to be rewritten. Clear and comprehensive security concepts and sound mechanisms for defense planning were in reality not drafted until 1997. An important role in the drafting of defense planning concepts was played by the assistance of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and United States (so called Kievenaar Studies).

In accordance with the "Law on Romanian National Defense Planning", the planning of defense is based on political and strategic decisions and options made by the Romanian parliament, president and government, as well as other public institutions that assume security and national defense responsibilities. According to the Law, the national values and interests, the risks and threats to these values, as well as the main guidelines for the provision of Romanian national security are defined by a presidential document officially presented to the Parliament – the *National Security Strategy*. In order to accomplish the pro-

visions of the National Security Strategy, the government elaborates the *White Paper of Defense*, establishing the goals, tasks and budget of the security and defense institutions. After this, each ministry or public institution with defense and security related tasks has to prepare its own departmental plan, program or strategy according to the governing program and White Paper provisions. At the level of departmental strategies, the Ministry of National Defense, as the authority responsible for the military defense of the country, produces the *Military Strategy*, while the Romanian Interior Ministry and Intelligence Services prepare their own strategies according to their own responsibilities.

The first document, “National Security Strategy of Romania”, was approved by the Country’s Supreme Defense Council (CSAT) in June 1999. In December 2001, President Iliescu presented to the Parliament the new “National Security Strategy of Romania”^{xxx}, which proposes a more clear vision on the security framework and on Romania’s strategic goals, defines the national interests and establishes the main directions of action for ensuring security. This time, the new strategy identifies both risk factors and vulnerabilities of the domestic life and establishes clear directions of action in the political, administrative, economic, social, educational, national safety, national defense or external policy field.

According to the provisions of the National Defense Planning Law No. 63/2000, the Ministry of National Defense implemented a new planning, programming, evaluation and budgeting system (PPBES), since 2002 (tested in

2000 and 2001). The core of this new system is an integrated conception of human, material and financial resources planning and management, which will improve the capability of the AF to fulfill its operational criteria. The framework of democratic control offers the civilian leadership the opportunity to set goals for the armed forces – and for a restructured military to prove that is able to accomplish the tasks. Indeed, a Pentagon official observed that “...the Directive of Defense Planning is one of the best in Eastern Europe”, but that “...it isn’t completely implemented”.^{xxxi}

b. The restructuring of the military organization

The main goal of the structural reforms of the RAF has been to create a compact, flexible NATO-compatible military, which is able to adequately provide for the security of the Romanian people. The reform process was, initially, triggered by the requirements of the 1989 revolution and by the signing of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990. As a result, in November 1990 the RAF reduced its tank strength from 2,850 to 1,375, its armored vehicle strength from 3,102 to 2,100, its artillery from 3,789 to 1,475 pieces, and its aircraft from 505 to 430. The RAFs initial stage of reform lasted until 1992, and should be understood primarily as a period of de-communization. A more organized and coherent series of reforms were begun in 1993, leading to the approval of a new structure for the Ministry of National Defense in 1994. The later “*Army 2000*” is a document, which explored ways to improve the quality of Romanian military structures. The Romanian Ministry of

National Defense was fully reorganized in May 1997 – with changes affecting both central structures and combat forces. These changes were conducted under PfP’s Planning and Review Process (PARP) with the aim of increasing NATO interoperability.

One of the first measures taken by the newly elected government in January 2001 was to adopt the “Ordinance for Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defense”. According to this law, the RAF is directed by a General Staff and consists of three Services: Land Forces, Air and Air Defense Forces and Naval Forces. They are organized into Operational Forces and Territorial Forces.

The direct management of these forces is the responsibility of the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff is also the Chief of Defense, and Romania’s senior military officer. The General Staff itself has recently been reorganized with “joint” directorates similar to those in NATO and United States staffs. The General Staff has recently published a medium term planning document called *Strategic Vision 2010* in relation to the future structure of the RAF. This envisages a major shift towards all volunteer forces by 2005 (70 per cent compared to the present 47 per cent). Moreover, as part of the second cycle of NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), Romania aims to reduce the size of its military to a peacetime strength of 112,000, and a wartime strength of 230,000 (fully mobilized).

c. Changing the system of education and training

Education and training is a central part

of any process of professionalization. The first step in this process was introduced in 1995 in the form of the *Concept of Reforming Military Education*. The goal of the concept is the development of professional military personnel and the training of students at specifically military educational institutions. The basic institutions for military education include military high schools, post-high school education for warrant officers and NCOs, higher education for command officers (three military academies), technical education, command and staff training, a training system for experts, a Regional Center for PfP Training, a Regional Center for the Management of Defense Resources and centers for Foreign Languages education.

The *Concept of Human Resource Management* was initially elaborated in 1997. It was later completed with British, Dutch and US assistance, and established a National Defense Framework Action Plan for 2000-2003 and a Long Term Framework (to 2010). The plans identified three options for the ultimate size of the RAF, ranging from 87,000 to 140,000. The middle option of 112,000 servicemen and 28,000 civilians was identified as the ideal size for Romania’s national defense system, with a deadline of 2003 set for reaching this goal. This downsizing will form the first phase of Romania’s military reform process. In phase two – between 2004 and 2007 – further reforms will concentrate on the modernization of equipment, and the development of full interoperability with NATO. The Concept of Human Resource Management also provides for the streamlining of the RAFs top-heavy officer corps

– a structural legacy from the communist period. The current 30,000 strong officer corps will be halved, with the number of colonels reduced from 2,300 to 630, the number of lieutenant colonels from 5,600 to 1,800 and the number of Majors from 7,800 to 2,200. This will create an officer to NCO ratio of 1/3. As a result of these reforms, 11,000 officers and warrant officers left the RAF in 1998. 94 per cent of these took voluntary retirement, and 85 per cent of them were drawn from the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel and colonel. Two other important initiatives for the reform of the RAF include the Military Career Guide and Professional Reconversion. The *Career Guide*, which has been applicable from June 2001, is an important framework for the whole process of professionalization of RAF, according to its new missions and roles. Promotion is now a transparent process and is based on clear rules. *Professional Reconversion* is of fundamental importance in the context of the halving of the officer corps. The main measures here include the provision of social protection for officers who leave the army, as well as assistance and training to help them find a civilian career.

The need for interoperability with NATO in the framework of PfP has also established new goals and strategies for the reform of the RAF. PARP, for example, has provided a structured approach for developing the interoperability of the RAF with NATO Allies. Subsequently, the MAP has helped push Romanian military reform towards the Power Projection goal. In the field of education, centers for foreign languages training, peacekeeping, and defense planning

training have also been established. Moreover, more than 1500 Romanian officers have attended courses in NATO member countries.

Slovenia

a. Changing the role and missions of SAF

Slovenians have had to build their army from scratch since they gained independence in 1991, on the ashes of Territorial Defense Forces of the former Yugoslavia. Territorial Defense units contributed essentially to the gaining of independence so, it fulfilled the role of a standing army by 1994, when this was transformed in the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF). The basic principles and roles of SAF are determined by the Constitution, the Resolution on the National Security, the Military Defense Doctrine (1995), the Military Defense Strategy (1998) and the National Strategy for Integration into NATO (1998).

According to the Defense Law (1994), the fundamental tasks of the SAF are: to carry out the military training, to assure combat readiness, to defend the country in case of attack, to cooperate in civil protection and disaster relief and to carry out the responsibilities of international organizations^{xxxii}.

The official document “Facts about Slovenia-Defense System” states that the defense system is comprised of complementary military and civil defense. While the military role is carried out by SAF, the civil defense is a unified system of measures and activities that support military defense.

A coherent and operational system of defense planning was put in place after

1999. Guidelines to organization of defense and long-term development and equipping programs are determined by the National Assembly (annually) and reviewed by the defense committees. According to planning methodology, there are 3 planning periods: long term (for 10 years), short term (5 years) and fiscal year. The General Staff of SAF is in charge with force planning.

b. Changing the structure

The structure of SAF evolved from the Territorial Defense (police type) to a standing army. The Military Defense Strategy (1998) took into account the interoperability with NATO and envisaged force restructuring by 2010 into Rapid Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces and Support Defense Force. The General Staff is fully integrated into MoD and the chief of Defense is accountable to the Minister. The Main Defense Force is the largest part of the SAF.

According to the recent document “Size and Structure of SAF 2010”, the total of wartime strength is 76,000, being reduced to 47,000 in 2001, of which only 6% are professional^{xxxiii}. In 2000 there were 4,926 professional militaries and 3,368 conscripts^{xxxiv}.

c. System of education and training

After independence, Slovenia decided to adopt a civilian oriented education system rather than classical military academies. The military knowledge and training is carried out later through short-term courses or one-year military professionalization. The professional military education is carried out in the Military Education Center of the MoD that comprises Officer Training School, NCO Training School, Command and Staff

School, Mountain School and Foreign Languages. The civilian defense experts are trained at the University of Ljubljana, Defense Study program. As for the training of conscripts, of 227 days of military service, only 110 are spent for operational training so “most conscripts were inadequately trained with low level of fitness and motivation...”^{xxxv}. Generally speaking, between 1991 and 1999 there was a shortage of manpower and an inappropriate human resource policy (lack of clear promotion criteria, shortage of manpower etc).

In conclusion, it can be stated from the comparative analysis presented above that Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia started the process of democratization of civil-military patterns following different paths but achieving similar pattern, common to NATO's countries. If the reform started in Bulgaria through a top-down decision, in Romania through a bloody revolution, in Slovenia through a bloodless break-up from the federal state of Yugoslavia. There were the internal forces that ignited the reform and supported it, but the Western assistance and financial support was fundamental in drawing the plans, in clarifying the goals and making the patterns interoperable with the Western one. Next, we will describe the role of Western assistance in building democratic civil-military relations.

The role of Western assistance

Although there were no specific “civil-military programs” of assistance, they were incorporated within other programs. The assistance programs were pursued either at multilateral or bilateral levels. Besides the assistance programs, the

new security environment after September 11, 2001 created new interests and boosted the preparation and lobby for integration of SEE countries within Western institutions. This part of the study will briefly describe the role of Western assistance, on both multilateral and bilateral levels.

Multilateral Assistance

The United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (through its Code of Conduct) and the European Union were institutions involved in supporting the transformation and democratization of CEE, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the most active and influential.

The Role of NATO and Partnership for Peace

NATO has been the main multilateral organization able and interested to promote a democratic civil-military pattern. It acted more like a “carrot” for SEE countries in search of integration to a more prosperous Western world. The Study of NATO Enlargement (1995) openly claimed that its goal is to support democratic reforms in CEE, including the democratic control of Armed Forces and set some indicators for the countries willing to join NATO.

Aware of the lack of civilian expertise, NATO ran a large number of activities to develop civilian expertise on security. NATO has strengthened its information programs for partners including conferences and seminars, (including at the NATO Defense College and at the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau) visit programs, fellowships, etc. NATO was

and still is making another long-term investment in European stability through its ongoing enlargement process. The main instrument of NATO assistance to SEE has been the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Its main goals were to expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance. In the sense of a clear roadmap for reform, Membership Action Plan (MAP) was essential for Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.

If NATO had a clear-cut goal in supporting democratization of civil-military relations in SEE, mostly as a condition for accession to its structure (see the “Study of NATO Enlargement”), the European Union has had a different role in that process. After the Kosovo crisis, the EU has committed to solving the Balkans problems and has launched the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe at Cologne, on June 10, 1999. The Stability Pact aims at strengthening countries in South Eastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity, in order to achieve stability in the whole region. On the other hand, if Slovenia was invited earlier to start the negotiation of EU accession and was closely assisted by the EU, after 1999, Bulgaria and Romania were also invited to start negotiations and now they have few chapters left in order to finish the negotiation and, most probably, will be invited to join the EU in 2007. However,

some bilateral assistance programs of individual EU countries were very helpful in building democratic civil-military patterns.

The Role of Bilateral Assistance

Although countries such as U.K., Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and Greece were very supportive of Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, by far the most important donor were the United States.

US bilateral assistance was delivered both for the development of civil society and for the military reform. In the field of civil society development, USAID was the most important provider of funds through its Global Bureau’s Center for Democracy and Governance, promoting democratization of CMR, demobilization and reintegration of the militaries. It managed the Congressional funds under Supporting East European Democracies Act (SEED). Nongovernmental organizations such as National Endowment for Democracy, National Democratic Institute or International Republican Institute were also involved in civil society capacity building.

In the field of military reform, the Pentagon runs important programs such as Mil-to-Mil, the Warsaw Initiative and International Military Education and Training (IMET). The last one was important because it supported military personnel to come to US military schools and face first-hand not only exposure on military professionalism but also understand the role of the military in a democracy. According to some Pentagon info, between 1993-2003, Romanian military received more than 79 million USD and

recently received 11,5 million USD under the Freedom Consolidation Act.

At a different level, a special role in assisting the SEE countries with a lobby in U.S. was played by the US Committee on NATO, an influential bipartisan American NGO, established after the Madrid decision in order to help Clinton Administration pass the ratification of the admission protocols for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. After 2001, US Committee on NATO, under Bruce Jackson’s leadership was very active, very skillful and influential in bringing the V10 countries close to trans-Atlantic structures and in inviting Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia to NATO. As “Congressional Quarterly” acknowledged, “...these political allies offer applicant governments advice on whom to see and how to present their case...”^{xxxvi}.

Besides the American and some individual European countries’ help, a special role in supporting the invitation of Romania and Bulgaria in NATO has been played by the so-called “2+2”, mechanism, an informal cooperation mechanism of Bulgaria and Romania with Greece and Turkey.

Transatlantic Rift? Mars and Venus debate about the satellites

By the end of 2002, the peoples of SEE countries saw their integration into NATO and EU as an intertwined process or two different faces of a similar process, integration into the West. If the public perceived NATO accession as driven by security reasons, EU integration was mostly seen as a transformation process

of return to their Western identity and a more prosperous club.

However, transatlantic disputes started in 2002 as an academic debate, triggered by Kagan's article on "Mars and Venus"^{xxxvii}. The eventual dispute over the policy on Iraq, in the early 2003, and Rumsfeld's words on "old" and "new" Europe are just a frivolous definition of some deep transatlantic rift that might reveal a new geopolitical struggle for the global power. A statement of the 10th candidate countries to NATO, supported somehow by the US Committee on NATO triggered the anger of European leaders such as Jacques Chirac, who bluntly told countries like Bulgaria and Romania that "if they wanted to find a way to reduce their chances to enter Europe, they could not have found a better way"^{xxxviii}. Chirac's words expressed the West European concern that countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria could be used by the US as a Trojan Horse to undermine the process of building a powerful EU. Although the dispute didn't end but only attenuated, it has created a deep concern for countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, that consider the rift will endanger their strategic goals of integration into Western structures.

Conclusion

It can be stated from the data above that a civilian democratic control of Armed Forces has been put into place in Southeastern Europe. Invitation of all three countries to NATO is an indicator that the pre-conditions of the "Study of NATO Enlargement" were accomplished.

The geography and history of these three countries have had many similari-

ties and the process of institutionalization of CDC followed its own similarities. The immediate historical legacy matters, but in different ways. While Bulgaria and Romania have had large armies and the professionalization meant the (re)invention of new missions, streamlining the military organization and getting off the redundant personnel, or finding civilians with strategic thinking, for Slovenia the main problem was how to build from scratch a military organization and to recruit personnel. The legal framework has been put in place relatively in a similar way and timeline. In this respect, the new security environment (globalization) played an important role in fostering the change. There were not only new asymmetric threats but also opportunities that pushed towards cooperative security. NATO and its PfP program acted more like a carrot. It was not until 1997, when Jeffrey Simon^{xxxix} from NDU evaluated Bulgarian reforms as being "seven years loss" and Madrid rejection that offered a new impetus to Southeast European reforms.

The first 14 years were more difficult for the SEE countries with a lot of crises happening there. Even Slovenia, considered as being a country more advanced in political reform sector, had its own crisis, created by the former defense minister Janez Jansa (1990-1994) who left 4 political parties from left to right wing and who filled the superior structures of MoD with loyalists to his political party, deprived the President and the Commander-in-Chief of confidential information and set up a commando unit to conduct clandestine operations. In Romania, the Minister of Defense and

the chief of the General Staff presented a rather pessimistic evaluation of the RAFs state of readiness in the year 2000, for example. They concluded that the military remained unprepared and poorly trained, mainly because of lack of resources.

One can see that if the reform process was triggered by the internal forces, the guidance and "know-how" have been provided by Western institutions. However, a trans-Atlantic rift will make the situation in Romania and Bulgaria more difficult since those countries see the West as a prosperous and united actor.

In conclusion, further development of the civil-military patterns described above would be achieved by the SEE within NATO. The democratization of civil-military relations is a continuous process that will be perfected. As some recent studies showed, a "second-generation problematic" approach raised the problems of efficient governance and global security policy.^{xl}

Notes:

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ⁱⁱ This study considers that Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, FYROM, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and Turkey belong to the area of SEE. During the Cold War, the majority of these countries were considered as part of the Eastern bloc or the "Balkans". Due to the negative connotation of the "Balkan" term, some countries, such as Slovenia and Croatia wanted to be seen as Central-European countries while Romania considers itself as geographically out of the Balkans but related to it through history.

ⁱⁱⁱ See Constantine Danopoulos, Daniel Zirker, *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), Jean Callaghan, Jurgen Kuhlmann, *Military and Society in 21st Century* (Transaction Publishers, 2000), Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forester, *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe* (Palgrave: Houndmills, 2002).

^{iv} *Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria*, Available: <http://www.uni-wuertzburg.de/law/bu0000.html>

^v For more on legislative framework see *Civil-Military Relations in the Process of Security and Defense Policy Formulation: A Case of Bulgaria's Participation in PJP*, available at <http://www.nato.int> and "The Nature of Civil-Military Relations in Post-Totalitarian Bulgaria", in *Democratic Control of the Military in Post-Communist Europe: Guarding the Guards*, edited by A. Cottey, T. Edmunds and A. Forester, Palgrave, 2001.

^{vi} G. Diaconescu, F. Șerban, N. Pavel, *Controlul democratic asupra armatei*, Ed. Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1996, presents these institutions in details.

^{vii} See C. Monac și C. Sava, *Stărilor excepționale*, Ed., 2000, pag. 305-320.

^{viii} G. Diaconescu, F. Șerban, N. Pavel, *Controlul democratic asupra armatei*, Ed. Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1996, presents these institutions in detail.

^{ix} I.M. Pașcu, *Parliamentary Control over the Military*, in K.W. Treptow, M.E. Ionescu, eds., *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration*, Iași-Oxford-Portland, 1999, pag. 112-120.

^x One of the main critics of this overlapping of responsibilities is the Dutch professor Peter Volten, see *Organizing*

National Defenses for NATO Membership, *Harmonie Paper 15*, Centre for European Security Studies, Gronigen, 2001, p.108-110. The issue will be analyzed in the next subchapter.

^{xi} Apud A. Bebler, *Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia*, in C. Danopoulos, D. Zirker, p.201

^{xii} These institutions are presented in detail by G. Diaconescu, F. Șerban, N. Pavel, *Controlul democratic asupra armatei*, Ed. Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1996.

^{xiii} For details on the issue of transparency, see the recent book *Transparency in defence policy, military budgeting and procurement*, edited by T. Tagarev, under the auspices of Geneva Center for Democratic Control of AF and George C. Marshal-Bulgaria, Sofia, 2002.

^{xiv} see D. Greenwood, *Transparency in Defence Budget and Budgeting*, page 27-35, in Tagarev, *Transparency...*

^{xv} For a comprehensive analysis of Romanian civil society see *Making Civil Society Work. Romania 2001*, study made by IDEE Foundation.

^{xvi} Michael Sheehan, *The Role of NGOs in Building Security in South Eastern Europe*, in *Central European Issues*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999/2000, p. 44-49.

^{xvii} I would notice here the pretty active role played by the Tac-Tic Logistical

Center, which undertook, in the period 1996-1997, a program – "Security and Transparency", funded by the Foundation for Civil Society's Development. A similar program was coordinated by the author of this study within the "Civil Society Foundation, finalized through the co-editing of the reader in military sociology "Armata și Societatea" (Armed Forces and Society).

^{xviii} M. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier- A Social and Political Portrait* (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd, 1960) and S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957). See Chapter I of this study.

^{xix} This wide definition of professional armed forces was proposed by Anthony Forester from Kings College and accepted by participants at the conference "Transforming the Post-Communist Militaries", Watchfield, UK, a conference in which the author of this studies also took part.

^{xx} See Laura Cleary, *Out with the Old, In with the New: The Challenge of Asserting Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Bulgaria*, in *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 17, No. 3, pag. 307-320.

^{xxi} National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1998, available: http://www.md.government.bg/eng/military_doctrine.html

^{xxii} Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1999, available:

http://www.md.government.bg/en/military_doctrine.html

^{xxiii} White Paper on the Defense and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2001, available: <http://www.md.government.bg/en/index.htm>

^{xxiv} See Valeri Ratchev, *NATO and the South-Eastern European Security Perspectives: Implications for Evolution of the National Security Institutions and Decision-Making Process in Bulgaria*, p. 35-39, available: <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/f97-99.htm>

^{xxv} The organization of BAF is drawn from the White Paper on Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria, available: <http://www.md.government.bg/en/index.htm>

^{xxvi} See *The Professionalisation of BAF: Lessons from Practice*, unpublished paper by MG Lyuben Pandev, presented at JSCSC conference, London, 26-29 April 2001.

^{xxvii} Ibid.

^{xxviii} White Book on Defense, chapter 4.7,

^{xxix} Apud V. Danov, *Comparative Analysis of the Reforms in the Armies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria*, NATO Research Fellowship 1999-2001, p. 61-62, available: <http://www.nato.int>

^{xxx} *Romania's National Security Strategy*, in *Monitorul Oficial*, part I, no. 822, 20 December 2001.

^{xxxi} R. Georgescu, *NATO cere României să-și evalueze mai bine resursele militare* (NATO requests Romania a better evaluation of its military resources), *România Liberă*, (19 March 2001), p. 3.

^{xxxii} Defense Act, 1991

^{xxxiii} For more on SAF see the web-site: <http://www.mo-rs.si/eng>

^{xxxiv} I. Kotnik, M. Malesic, *Professionalisation of the Slovenian AF*, unpublished paper, April 2001.

^{xxxv} I. Kotnik-Dvojmoc, E. Kopac, *Professionalisation of SAF*, in A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, A. Forester, ..., p.186.

^{xxxvi} See Pat Towell, *NATO Candidates use Finesse, Persistence to Cultivate Hill Relationship*, in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 09 febr., 2002.

^{xxxvii} See R. Kagan, *Power and Weakness*, Policy Review, no. 5, 2002.

^{xxxviii} See Th. Fuller, *American lobbyist swayed Eastern Europe's Iraq response*, in *International Herald Tribune*, Feb. 20, 2003.

^{xxxix} J. Simon, *Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Years Lost*, Strategic Forum, no. 142, May 1998.